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Over the last few years, discussing international parental child abduction has become 
impossible without considering the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter “the Court”). More and more applicants – both the abducting parent, and the left-
behind parent – have found their way to the Strasbourg Court. This has resulted in a boom of 
case law and, consequently, keeping track of all these decisions has become evermore 
challenging. In order not to get lost in this whirlwind of cases, this article will discuss some of 
the most recent decisions by the Court.
1
 The aim is not to give a detailed analysis of each of 
these cases, but to point out some interesting and important developments. Two decisions will 
be dealt with in-depth: Hoholm v. Slovakia
2
, a case under the scope of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”), and M.A. v. Austria3, a case 
considering a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Before the analysis of these decisions, a brief 
introduction will recall the two main international instruments and important case law of the 
Court.  
 
 
I. A quick reminder 
 
A. Relevant international and European rules  
 
At the international level, the most important instrument to deter and resolve international 
parental abduction is the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (hereinafter “the Abduction Convention”) by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.
4
 The Abduction Convention is a successful instrument, with 93 
Contracting States, including all EU Member States.
5
 It introduced a system of administrative 
cooperation between States by means of centralised authorities to assure the prompt return of 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this article the most recent cases are all cases available on the HUDOC search page 
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int) on the topic of international parental child abduction, rendered after X v. Latvia, no. 
27853/09, ECHR, 26 November 2013. For an overview, see the table at pages 13 and 14.  
2
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, no. 35632/13, ECHR, 13 January 2015. 
3
 M.A. v. Austria, no. 4097/13, ECHR, 15 January 2015. 
4
 Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, for all relevant information regarding this Convention, 
see: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24.  
5
 For all Contracting States and dates of ratification, see: 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (accessed 5 May 2015). 
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the child. The Abduction Convention is only applicable when the removal is wrongful, and 
the lawfulness of a removal is not always easy to determine, as illustrated by Manic v. 
Lithuania.
6
 An unlawful removal can become lawful during the course of domestic 
proceedings, making the Abduction Convention no longer relevant.
7
 Under the Abduction 
Convention a removal is deemed unlawful when it “is in breach of rights of custody attributed 
to a person […] under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident”.8 The 
overarching goal of the Abduction Convention is to protect the best interests of the child.
9
 The 
way to achieve this is by guaranteeing the swift return to the state of habitual residence prior 
to the wrongful removal.
10
 The idea is that the courts of the state of habitual residence are best 
placed to deal with the merits of the case, that is custody rights.
11
 The Abduction Convention 
foresees very limited exceptions to the return order.
12
  
 
When a child is wrongfully removed from one EU member state to another, the Brussels IIa 
Regulation applies. Article 11 deals with wrongful removal, and is mainly inspired by the 
Abduction Convention, but makes some significant additional requirements for the member 
states.
13
 In this respect the child must be heard in all proceedings applying Articles 12 and 13 
of the Abduction Convention, unless it would be inappropriate considering the child’s age or 
degree of maturity.
14
 The return judgement has to be delivered within six weeks from the 
                                                 
6
 Manic v. Lithuania, no. 46600/11, ECHR, 13 January 2015. The facts of the case were quite complex. The 
Lithuanian mother took the child from London to Lithuania for a vacation, but remained there with the child 
after she notified the father that their relationship was over. She changed her son’s permanent address to 
Lithuania. The father responded by sending a request to the Vilnius court for the return of his son. Though the 
Vilnius court recognized that the removal was wrongful, it refused the return because of the strong connection 
between the mother and the child. It decided that the child could only return together with his mother, which was 
in fact financially impossible for her. Instead of filing appeal, the father initiated proceedings in the UK. The 
High Court of Justice in England and Wales decided that the child should permanently reside in Lithuania. The 
father did not appeal this decision. The case before the Court dealt with the non-enforcement in Lithuania of the 
British judgment, leading to a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
7
 Because of the decision of the High Court in England and Wales the case no longer revolved around the 
wrongful removal of the child, but dealt with the contact rights for the father. See: Manic v. Lithuania, para 106. 
8
 Article 3 of the Abduction Convention. Sometimes neither the parties nor the involved authorities recognizes 
the situation to be a case of international parental child abduction and everyone omits to contact the central 
authorities. This was the case in Furman v. Slovenia and Austria: Furman v. Slovenia and Austria, no. 16608/09, 
ECHR, 5 February 2015. For the Court this led to a violation of article 8 ECHR by – among other aspects – 
disregarding the cross-border dimension of the case and by consequently acting less prompt and efficient than 
what was to be expected. The Court acknowledged that Slovenia was not obliged to apply any measures pursuant 
to the Abduction Convention. Nevertheless, the abduction took place from Slovenia to Austria, both EU Member 
States, so they were also obliged under the Brussels IIa Regulation to cooperate. See: Furman v. Slovenia and 
Austria, paras 112 and 122. 
9
 Preamble to the Abduction Convention. 
10
 Article 12 of the Abduction Convention. 
11
 E. PÉREZ-VERA, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, 1982, point 19, 
www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (accessed 5 May 2015). 
12
 Under Article 12 the return can be refused when proceedings are initiated more than one year since the 
abduction and the child is settled in its new environment. Article 13(1)(a) allows to refuse a return when the 
person asking for the return did not have custody rights over the child at the time of the abduction or acquiesced 
in the abduction. A refusal is also possible under Article 13(1)(b) in case of a grave risk that would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or place it in an intolerable situation. When the child objects to the return 
an exception is possible under Article 13(2), that is when the child has an age and degree of maturity at which it 
is appropriate to take account of its views. Lastly, for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
the return can be denied under Article 20. 
13
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1–29. 
14
 Article 11(2) Brussels IIa Regulation. 
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application.
15
 There is a stricter application of the exception of “grave risk”: the domestic 
courts cannot refuse a return based on Article 13(b) of the Abduction Convention when “it is 
established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the child 
after his or her return”.16 However, the most important addition is that the Regulation changes 
the rules when the state of abduction has refused the return based on Article 13(b) of the 
Abduction Convention. In that case the state of habitual residence prior to the wrongful 
removal gets a second chance to decide upon the case and can override the decision based on 
Article 11(8) Brussels IIa of the Regulation. This decision can be complemented by a 
certificate of enforceability under Article 42 Brussels IIa so that it is immediately enforced in 
the State of abduction.  
 
 
B. Important previous case law of the Court 
 
The Court’s interpretation of the Abduction Convention has always been a strict one.17 That 
was until the decision of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland. In this case the Court decided 
that enforcing the return order would lead to a violation of the abducting mother’s and child’s 
right to family life.
18
 The decision was heavily criticised. One of the main critiques was that 
the decision would jeopardise the speediness of the procedure under the Abduction 
Convention, which is of paramount importance in child abduction cases.
19
 This is because the 
Court explicitly stated that a return order cannot be applied automatically.
20
 Moreover, it 
required domestic courts to make an “in-depth examination of the entire family situation” and 
to assess the best interest of the child in each case individually.
21
 Because the Court required 
such intense scrutiny by the national courts, it was feared that this would result in a slippery 
slope for domestic courts to examine the merits of the case, which goes completely against the 
principles of the Abduction Convention.
22
 The Court came to its decision because it found 
that the child was well settled in its new environment.
23
 Under Article 12 of the Abduction 
Convention this exception can only apply when the proceedings for return were initiated more 
than one year after the abduction, which was not the case. The risk therefore grew that after 
this decision abducting parents could possibly be encouraged to prolong the proceedings until 
                                                 
15
 Unless in exceptional circumstances, see: Article 11(3) Brussels IIa Regulation.  
16
 Article 11(4) Brussels IIa Regulation. 
17
 L. WALKER, “The Impact of the Hague Abduction Convention on the Rights of the Family In the Case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee: The Danger of Neulinger”, 
J.Priv.Int.L. 2010, vol. 3, 649. 
18
 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, no. 41615/07, ECHR, 6 July 2010, para 151. 
19
 L. SILBERMAN, “Hague Convention on Child Abduction and Unilateral Relocations by Custodial Parents: A 
Perspective from the United States and Europe - Abbott, Neulinger, Zarraga”, Oklahoma Law Review, vol. 63, 
733-750; L. WALKER, “The Impact of the Hague Abduction Convention on the Rights of the Family In the Case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee: The Danger of Neulinger”, 
J.Priv.Int.L. 2010, vol. 3, 649-682; S. SAROLÉA, “Le retour immédiat de l’enfant déplacé illicitement face à 
l’écoulement du temps: principe ou option?” (comment under Brussel 11 februari 2010), RTDF 2010, 1200, for 
an a detailed and critical analysis of the case Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland. A contrario, see: L. STEVENS, 
“Internationale parentale ontvoering en het belang van het tijdsverloop: noot bij Neulinger and Shuruk v. 
Switzerland, E.H.R.M. 6 juli 2010 (GK), nr. 41615/07”, TvMR 2010, afl. 8, 15-16; R. RIETIKER, “Un enlèvement 
d'enfant devant la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme: l'affaire Neulinger et Shuruk 
c. Suisse analysée à la lumière des méthodes d'interprétation des traités internationaux”, Rev.trim.dr.h. 2012, 
410-411. 
20
 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, para 138. 
21
 Ibid, paras 138 and 139. 
22
 WALKER, supra n 12, 649. 
23
 STEVENS, supra n 12, 16. 
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the child would be well settled in its new environment and a return would be made 
impossible.
24
  
 
After the controversy in Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, all eyes were on the Court 
when it had to decide its subsequent case X v. Latvia. Although the Court upheld its 
controversial reasoning from Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland,
25
 it is clear it took (some 
of) the critique to heart. It tried to close the gap with the Abduction Convention by putting 
much more emphasis on the importance of the Abduction Convention and its principles, like 
the prompt return of the child to the State of its habitual residence prior to the wrongful 
removal.
26
 It appears the Court is not trying to undermine the Abduction Convention, but will 
examine in each individual case if the measures taken by national authorities are in line with 
the rights preserved in the ECHR.
27
  
 
 
II. Recent decisions of the Court 
 
Given the number of recent cases, all decided after X v. Latvia in 2013, the Court has had 
plenty of opportunity to fine-tune its approach. The following analysis will scrutinise whether 
the Court has made any changes in its reasoning or whether it has upheld its previous case-
law. It will become clear that in these types of cases the Court continues to hold a very high 
threshold for States to abide by. In all cases the examination of the Court led to a violation.
28
  
 
The rights generally invoked in cases of international parental child abduction are the right to 
a fair trial (Article 6) and the right to family life (Article 8). In a way both rights are also 
intertwined in these types of cases. The Court has repeatedly held that although Article 8 does 
not entail any specific procedural requirements, there is inevitably a procedural component in 
that sense that “the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair, 
and as such affords due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8”.29 Another 
procedural component of Article 8 is the reasonable time in which proceedings dealing with 
return decisions have to be taken.
30
 This leads the Court to decide the case mostly under 
Article 8 ECHR, although a violation of procedural elements is also at stake.
31
  
 
                                                 
24
 SILBERMAN, supra n 12, 744. 
25
 R. SCHUZ, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013, 27. 
26
 See for instance X v. Latvia, paras 93-94 and 105-106. Para 105 reads: “Against this background the Court 
considers it opportune to clarify that its finding in paragraph 139 of the Neulinger and Shuruk judgment does not 
in itself set out any principle for the application of the Hague Convention by the domestic courts”. 
27
 The national courts enjoy a large margin of appreciation to evaluate the best interest of the child in the light of 
the exceptions of the Abduction Convention. They are best-suited to decide upon the case seeing their direct 
contact with the concerned parties. The role of the Court is to supervise these national decisions, to see if they 
were fair and truly correspond to the best interest of the child: Ferrari v. Romania, no. 1714/10, ECHR, 28 April 
2015, para 46; X v. Latvia, paras 101 and 102. 
28
 In nine out of twelve cases the decision was even unanimous: See table at pages 13 and 14.  
29
 Manic v. Lithuania, para 108; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, no. 16424/90, ECHR, 24 February 1995, 
para 87. 
30
 Adžić v. Croatia, nr. 22643/14, ECHR, 12 March 2015, para 93. In this case the Croatian courts took three 
years to decide over the return of the child to the USA. This amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR. In V.P. 
v. Russia the Court however did recognize that the length of proceedings in international child abduction cases 
can be influenced by the international elements in those type of cases. See: V.P. v. Russia, no. 61362/12, ECHR, 
23 October 2014, para 154. 
31
 See for instance: Ferrari v. Romania, paras 30 and 31; Penchevi v. Bulgaria, no. 77818/12, ECHR, 10 
February 2015, para 78. 
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This article shall continue a discussion of, firstly, a decision in the scope of Article 6 ECHR 
and subsequently a decision in the scope of Article 8 ECHR. Some aspects of other decisions 
under Article 8 ECHR will also be highlighted. 
 
 
A. Article 6 ECHR: the duration of the length of the proceedings leading to a violation in 
Hoholm v. Slovakia 
 
The right to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 6 ECHR. Unlike the case of Neulinger and 
Shuruk v. Switzerland where the length of the proceedings led to the integration of the child in 
the State of abduction in favour of the abducting parent, the Court in Hoholm v. Slovakia 
came to a different conclusion. The excessive length of the proceedings – seven years –, 
caused by the national authorities and the Slovakian procedural system, was in violation of 
Article 6 ECHR.  
 
1. Facts of the case 
 
The case concerned a child abduction from Norway to Slovakia. The parents lived together in 
Norway with their two children. After they got divorced the Norwegian court determined the 
joint responsibility of the parents and put the care of the children with the Slovakian mother. 
It also barred the parents from unilaterally removing the children from Norwegian territory 
without the consent of the other parent.
32
 Nevertheless, in July 2005 the mother took the 
children to Slovakia. In December 2005 the father started proceedings under the Abduction 
Convention in Slovakia for the return of the children to Norway.
33
  
 
What follows are seven long years of proceedings in Slovakia (that is even before the case 
eventually got to Strasbourg) where the case went several times from the District court to the 
Regional court for appeal, up until the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court and back. 
In total the case was examined four times by the ordinary courts, and this both in first instance 
as on appeal, twice by the Supreme Court and once by the Constitutional Court.
34
  
An important procedural specificity of Slovakia is that the parties can request the Prosecutor 
General (Hereinafter “the PG”) to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the appeal by 
way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court.
35
 First the father 
and later the mother filed a petition to the PG. The father’s request was rejected because the 
extraordinary appeal would not be available for family matters.
36
 However, in a later round 
the mother was allowed an extraordinary appeal. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the 
lower courts because they had based their decision of return on a – by that time – out-dated 
social report of the Norwegian central authority.
37
 Finally, in December 2012, the Regional 
court decided that it was in their best interest that the children should not be returned to 
Norway since they wished to stay with their mother, and they had spent more than half of 
their lives in Slovakia and were well integrated.
38
 Upon this decision the father filed a 
complaint in Strasbourg claiming his rights protected by Article 6§1 ECHR taken alone and in 
conjunction with Article 13 ECHR had been violated due to the length of the proceedings. 
                                                 
32
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 8. 
33
 Ibid, paras 9 and 11. 
34
 Ibid, para 45. 
35
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 14. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid, para 21. 
38
 Ibid, paras 25 and 26. 
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2. Reasoning of the Court: excessive length of proceedings  
 
It was not the first child abduction case against Slovakia that found its way to the Court. In 
the case of López Guió v. Slovakia the Court also found a violation because of the length of 
proceedings in Slovakia, but then under Article 8 ECHR.
39
 This explains why the Court 
rightfully decides there is a violation of Article 6 ECHR. 
 
In its decision the Court reiterates that “the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings 
has to be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to […]: the 
complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what is at 
stake for the applicant in the dispute”.40 Neither the relative complexity of the case, nor the 
conduct of the applicant raised any problems. Referring to its decision in López Guió the 
Court makes a clear statement about what the domestic return proceedings should investigate. 
Since Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland there has been a fear that the in-depth examination 
would bring domestic courts to decide over the merits of the case. The Court clearly states 
here that that is not what it is asking.
41
 The subject matter of national proceedings deciding 
over the return of the child should stick to the standards of the Abduction Convention.
42
 The 
only three specific questions the national courts in the return proceedings should deal with 
are: “whether there has been a removal or retention of a child, whether such removal or 
retention was wrongful, and whether there are any obstacles to the child’s return”.43 In the 
spirit of the Abduction Convention any other questions, relating to the status of the child or 
the rights and responsibilities of the parents, should be dealt with by the courts in the State of 
habitual residence before the removal.
44
 On a side-note it should be mentioned here that it 
appears the national courts are not completely excused from the thorough “in-depth 
examination”. Less than a month after this decision, the Court repeated its previous “in-depth 
examination”-test in the case of Penchevi v. Bulgaria.45 The specific nature of that case makes 
it clear why the Court chose to go back to that test, but this makes it of course very difficult 
for domestic courts to know to what extend they should apply an “in-depth examination”.46  
 
Although the Court is hesitant to completely discard the existing system of remedies in 
international child abduction cases in Slovakia, it has its reservations about a system allowing 
appeals and extraordinary appeals on points of law that basically undermine the object and 
purpose of the Abduction Convention.
47
 The Court stresses the “critical importance attached 
to the passing of time” in abduction cases, especially because the passage of time is usually 
used as the most important argument not to return children.
48
 The Court also took into account 
the fact that the father was denied an extraordinary appeal to the PG, and that the length of the 
proceedings was jointly caused by the national authorities when they required up-to-date 
                                                 
39
 López Guió v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, ECHR, 3 June 2014. 
40
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 44. 
41
 Ibid, para 47. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 47; López Guió v. Slovakia, para 90. 
45
 Penchevi v. Bulgaria, para 55. This case dealt with a violation of Article 8 ECHR, but on behalf of the 
abducting mother. The Court concluded that there was a violation because no real analysis was conducted to give 
the child a travel document to travel abroad with his mother. In any case it is strange, and nonetheless confusing, 
that the Court applies a different “in-depth examination” depending whether the applicant is the abducting or the 
left-behind parent. 
46
 For more information regarding this case, see later II.C.3. 
47
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 49; López Guió v. Slovakia, para 108. 
48
 Hoholm v. Slovakia, para 51. 
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evidence after they examined the evidence with delay.
49
 The Court concluded that the length 
of the proceedings was excessive and a reasonable time was not met, causing a violation of 
Article 6§1 ECHR. Moreover, it found that there was also a violation of Article 13 ECHR – 
taken separately and in conjunction with Article 6 – by denying the father an effective remedy 
before the Slovakian authorities.
50
  
 
 
B. Article 8 ECHR: the principles of the Court’s case-law as shown in M.A. v. Austria  
 
The right to respect for family life is set out in Article 8 ECHR. Interference by the State is 
prohibited unless it “is accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.”51  
 
In the case of M.A. v. Austria the Court both examines the Abduction Convention and the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. The case is a good example of the interaction between these two 
international instruments. 
 
1. General principles  
 
When dealing with cases of international parental child abduction the Court has adopted a 
systematic approach to its case law.
52
 Firstly, it establishes whether or not there is “family 
life” between the applicant and the abducted child. Once this is decided, the Court examines if 
there is a failure to respect the applicant’s family life.53  
 
The goal of Article 8 is to protect the individual from arbitrary actions by public authorities.
54
 
This entails both negative as positive obligations for the State to ensure an effective respect 
for the right to family life.
55
 What these positive obligations exactly are is not defined. 
Applied to cases of international child abduction the Court has always found that these 
positive obligations include “the parent’s right to have measures taken with a view to being 
reunited with his or her child and an obligation on the national authorities to take such 
measures”.56 However, the positive obligations for the State are not absolute.57 The State 
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. In any case the State must strive to strike a fair 
balance between the competing interests of the individuals – both parents and the child – and 
of the community as a whole.
58
  
                                                 
49
 Ibid, paras 49 and 52. 
50
 Ibid, para 57. 
51
 Article 8(2) ECHR. 
52
 As an important note, it should be added that it seems the Court takes a slightly different approach when the 
applicant is the abducting parent. See for instance Penchevi v. Bulgaria, paras 62-74. In this case the Court deals 
with the examination of Article 8 in its traditional way: the accordance with the law of the interference; the 
pursuit of a legitimate aim; and the necessity in a democratic society. 
53
 See among others: Ferrari v. Romania, para 41; Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, no. 22909/10, ECHR, 
11 December 2014, para 147. 
54
 In many other cases the Court always repeats that the “mutual enjoyment by parents and children of each 
other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life and is protected under Article 8 of the 
Convention”. See: Ferrari v. Romania, para 43; Penchevi v. Bulgaria, para 53. 
55
 See among others: M.A. v. Austria, para 104; Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, para 149. 
56
 Adžić v. Croatia, para 92; M.A. v. Austria, para 105. 
57
 M.A. v. Austria, para 106. 
58
 Ferrari v. Romania no. 1714/10, para 44; M.A. v. Austria, para 106. 
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The Court interprets these positive obligations in the light of the Abduction Convention and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
59
 Even in cases where the Abduction Convention 
was not directly applicable to the case, the Court will rely on its general approach, referred to 
by the Court as its “Hague Convention case law” in V.P. v. Russia.60 The most important 
consideration is the best interest of the child. Since X. v. Latvia the Court has made it clear 
that the prevention and the immediate return of the child fall within this scope.
61
  
 
Since the speed of the return proceedings is key under the Abduction Convention, the Court 
holds that “the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its 
implementation”.62 The Court has always underlined the “urgent handling” of these cases 
because “the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for the relations between 
the child and the non-parent”.63 That is why both the Abduction Convention and the Brussels 
IIa Regulation foresee a timeframe of six weeks for the return of the child.
64
  
 
2. Facts of the case 
 
The Italian father petitioned the central authorities for the return to Italy of his daughter, 
wrongfully removed by her Austrian mother to Austria in February 2008.
65
 The Austrian 
court decided not to allow such return. Given her very young age, the girl would be exposed 
to a grave risk under Article 13(b) of the Abduction Convention.
66
 The father unsuccessfully 
appealed this decision and the Austrian courts awarded the mother sole custody over the 
child.
67
  
 
In compliance with Article 11(8) of the Brussel IIa Regulation, the father then initiated the so-
called ‘second chance’ proceedings asking again to order the return of his daughter, but this 
time before the Italian courts. The Italian court complied with the request and decided in July 
2009 that the child should return to Italy, but that she should live with her mother. The mother 
would therefore be helped by the local social services department to obtain accommodation in 
Italy. Only if the mother would not return with the child, the girl should stay with her father.
68
 
The court issued a certificate of enforceability under Article 42 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
With this certificate, the decision was immediately enforceable in Austria. 
 
                                                 
59
 And other international law applicable between the Contracting Parties: See for instance: Ferrari v. Romania, 
para 45; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, para 132; Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, ECHR, 25 
January 2000, para 95. 
60
 See for instance two cases with Russia: Russia has ratified the Abduction Convention on 1 October 2011, but 
the acceptance of other Contracting States happened after this date. However, even if at the time of the events the 
Abduction Convention did not apply to the case, the Court will indirectly apply it through its developed case-
law. See: Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia; V.P. v. Russia. Also important to know is that the fact that a 
State does not have a frame work set up for fighting child abduction, can lead to a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
See: Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, para 157. 
61
 Ferrari v. Romania, para 44; X v. Latvia, para 95. 
62
 Adžić v. Croatia, para 94; M.A. v. Austria, para 109. 
63
 Adžić v. Croatia, para 94; M.A. v. Austria, para 109; Blaga v. Romania, no. 54443/10, ECHR, 1 July 2014, 
para 72. 
64
 In the Abduction Convention the six week time period is not obligatory, but can give rise to a request for 
explanations. See Article 11 of the Abduction Convention and Article 11(3) of the Brussel IIa Regulation. 
65
 M.A. v. Austria, para 8. 
66
 Ibid, para 15. 
67
 Ibid, paras 18-22. 
68
 M.A. v. Austria, paras 23 and 24. 
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The father then attempted to enforce the Italian judgement in Austria. This led to proceedings 
before the Austrian Supreme Court, which in their turn led to a preliminary ruling before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (Hereinafter “the CJEU”).69 In its decision of 1 July 
2010 the CJEU confirmed that a change of circumstances that could be harmful to the best 
interest of the child should not obstruct the enforceability of the judgement. Any change of 
circumstances should be dealt with before the courts of the Member State (of the EU) of 
origin after the return.
70
 Subsequently, the Austrian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by 
the mother and sent the case back to the first-instance court to enforce the Italian judgement. 
The enforcement did not take place.
71
  
In the hope to see his rights enforced, the father successfully filed another claim before the 
Italian courts for the return of his daughter.
72
 The Italian court issues a certificate of 
enforceability. The mother then continued to fight the enforcement of this decision all the way 
up to the Austrian Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision (after 
the ruling of the CJEU) that any change in circumstances should be dealt with by the Italian 
courts.
73
 When the case then got sent back to the Austrian first-instance court, the judge tried 
to persuade the parents to reach a workable compromise, in order to avoid any trauma to the 
child when the return order would have to be enforced. The father informed the court that he 
did not want an extra hearing with the mother, but he agreed that they should reach a solution 
to make the return to Italy as least traumatic as possible. The mother wanted to participate in 
the hearing, but at the same time blocked any further steps by appealing the courts’ 
competence.
74
 Then she brought her case before the Court alleging a violation of Article 8 
ECHR, which was declared inadmissible.
75
 Because the Italian judgement ordering the return 
of the child was still not enforced, the father filed an application before the Court claiming a 
violation of his rights protected under Article 8 ECHR. 
 
3. Reasoning of the Court: failure to enforce a return order 
 
In M.A. v. Austria one of the main questions was what national authorities can do when the 
abducting parent does not want to cooperate and refuses to enforce the return order?
76
  
 
The Court repeated that, “coercive measures against children are not desirable in this sensitive 
area or might even be ruled out by the best interest of the child”.77 Although it is true that the 
State has to do everything in its power to reunite the parent and child, sometimes the passage 
of time does not allow for an immediate reunion, but requires preparatory measures. The 
particular circumstances of each case will determine the nature and extent of such measures.
78
 
Understanding and co-operation is key, and there is an onus on the State to make such co-
operation possible, while at the same time limiting coercion.
79
 In other cases the Court has 
considered the use of coercive measure against the abducting parent. In many States the 
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abducting parent can be charged with criminal proceedings because of the abduction.
80
 In a 
preceding case of Cavani v. Hungary the Court found that criminal proceedings against the 
abducting parent are not incompatible with the Convention rights. It repeated that, “the use of 
sanctions must not be ruled out in the event of unlawful behaviour by the parent with whom 
the children live”.81  
 
It is the obligation of the State to take all measure it could be reasonably expected to take to 
ensure the return of the child. These measures have to be swift and adequate while striking a 
fair balance between the interests of the child, the parents and the public order.
82
 That is the 
test for the Austrian authorities in this case. The Court then applies its general principles to 
the facts of the case. It found that the first part of the proceedings were not unreasonable. The 
referral by the Austrian Supreme Court to the CJEU was necessary.
83
 Nevertheless, the 
proceedings following the referral were too slow. The Court recognizes that the case is 
complicated and not all delays were due to the Austrian authorities; also the Italian authorities 
caused a delay by not replying, the applicant started a new round of proceedings in Italy and 
the parents did not want to cooperate with each other.
84
 However, the Court noted that, “the 
lack of co-operation between separated parents is not a circumstance which by itself may 
exempt the authorities from their positive obligations under Article 8 ECHR”.85 The fact that 
the return order at the time of the judgment is still not enforced, is an important factor for the 
Court.
86
 Since time is such an important issue in child abduction cases, it is up to the State to 
put in place an effective and timely framework for the enforcement of return orders.
87
 The 
Court even states that the presumption that the return is in the best interest of the child stands, 
as long as the return decision remains in force.
88
 The Court suggests that specific proceedings 
for a speedy enforcement should apply in these types of cases.
89
 That was not the case here 
and therefore, the Court concludes that there is no effective protection of the right to family 
life for the applicant.
90
 One could counter that the Court has now placed too high an 
expectation of the abilities of the state. If the parents systematically obstruct each other, then 
what should Austria have done to avoid a violation? The Court does not offer a solution. 
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C. Article 8 ECHR: other aspects  
 
1. Length of the proceedings 
 
The case of M.A. v. Austria dealt specifically with the failure to enforce the return order. 
However, there is not a final enforceable return order in all child abduction cases. In many 
cases of international parental child abduction the domestic court declines the return based on 
the fact that too much time has passed since the abduction and that the child is settled in its 
new environment. These are the remains of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland. 
Nonetheless, it seems times have changed and the Court, in line with the Abduction 
Convention, is much stricter about the swift timeframe at the domestic level. For instance in 
Adžić v. Croatia the domestic courts took three years to render a final decision and this was 
found to be too long.
91
 In Ferrari v. Romania the time period was much shorter, thirteen 
months, and even this period was deemed excessively long by the Court.
92
  
 
2. Hearing of the child: not a right to veto 
 
When the best interest of the child is the most important principle to follow in child abduction 
cases, one could assume much importance is attached to the opinion of the child. Both the 
Abduction Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation stress the significance of the opinion 
of the child, when the child is mature enough to be heard.
93
 Despite this wording, in reality 
the opinion of the child is not so evident. This can be illustrated by the case of Blaga v. 
Romania where the mother had abducted her three children from the USA to Romania. At the 
time of the abduction the oldest child was ten years old and the two other children (twins) 
were almost eight.
94
 In the proceedings for return, within a year after the abduction, all 
children had freely expressed their wish to stay in Romania. Under Romanian law ten years is 
the minimum age to take the child’s view into account. Because the oldest child was eleven 
and clearly expressed her wish to stay, the judge considered that the opinion of the younger 
twins should also matter since separating the children would be too traumatic for them.
95
 
 
The Court in its decision stated that although the opinion of children has to be taken into 
account, “their opposition is not necessarily an obstacle to their return”.96 The Court agrees 
that although only the oldest child met the national lawful required age to be heard, the 
conditions to rely on Article 13(2) of the Abduction Convention were met. The Bulgarian 
court had motivated its decision to hear all children sufficiently.
97
 What is more problematic 
according to the Court is the weight the domestic court attributed to the opinion of the 
children. The Bulgarian court had refused the return solely based on the refusal of the 
children. This is not in accordance with Article 13(2) of the Abduction Convention, which 
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only allows for the “possibility” to hear the child, it is not an obligation.98 The right of the 
child to be heard does not equal a right to veto to the return.
99
 The Court notes that also other 
factors should be put on the scale before the national court can refuse the return.
100
 
 
3. Prevention of international parental child abduction can lead to a violation  
 
The prevention of a wrongful removal can also lead to a violation of Article 8 ECHR.
101
 In 
Penchevi v. Bulgaria the mother wanted to take her son with her while obtaining her master’s 
degree and then her doctorate degree abroad in Germany, but could not do so without the 
consent of the father. Although the parents were divorced and the abusive father could not 
even see his child due to a restraining order, under Bulgarian law both parents had to give 
their consent for any kind of travel abroad of the child. The mother had obtained permission 
to take her child abroad with her, but the Bulgarian Supreme Court upheld its “established and 
binding case-law” that one parent alone could not decide to travel abroad with the child 
because this would essentially not be in the best interest of the child.
102
 
 
In its analysis the Court did not find this specific condition in Bulgarian law to be a 
disproportionate limitation of the right to family life. However, the Supreme Court of 
Bulgaria had applied this provision overly formalistic and did not conduct an actual analysis 
of the facts of the case. The Court observed that the Supreme Court had not taken into account 
the previous restraining order of the father; the fact that it was not the father but the 
grandparents who actually took care of the child while the mother was abroad; the sufficient 
financial means of the mother; the fact that the mother wanted to travel with the child to 
Germany where there were no real and specific risks for the travel; the care of the mother; the 
fact that the child adapted well in Germany; and elements of psychological, emotional, 
material or medical nature. Moreover, the court proceedings dealing with the travel of the 
child abroad lasted too long, two years and eight months. These elements amounted to a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR.
103
 
 
 
D. Article 8 ECHR: the Court gives its most recent state of the art 
 
The biggest problem after Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland in cases of international 
parental child abduction has been that there is no more clarity of the standards that national 
courts have to meet. In its most recent decision of Ferrari v. Romania the Court made an 
effort to shed some light on the situation. The Court made an outline of the obligation the 
State has to meet in order to respect the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR, interpreted 
in the light of the Abduction Convention.
104
  
 
Firstly, the national authorities, meaning the national courts, have to examine if one of the 
exceptions to an immediate return applies, especially when the exception is raised by one of 
the parties.
105
 An automatic return is out of the question.
106
 Secondly, whatever the outcome 
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of the case, return or no return, the national court has to make a sufficiently reasoned 
decision. The exceptions for return have to be applied strictly, but the specific and detailed 
circumstances of every case have to be taken into account and the decision has to be based on 
those circumstances.
107
 An automatic or stereotyped reasoning is not permissible. This is to 
guarantee that the factors that could lead to an exception to the return are effectively 
examined.
108
 Thirdly, the length of the proceedings has to be swift and adequate. Any delays 
in the procedure could lead to a violation of Article 8 ECHR.
109
 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
It is obvious from the most recent decisions decided by the Court that cases of international 
parental child abduction are very complex cases where there is never a clear-cut answer. That 
is why the Court holds on to its case-by-case approach. Every case needs to be scrutinised in 
the light of the ECHR individually. This, of course, does not make it easy for States or for the 
parents involved. What is clear is that the Court after Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland has 
softened the edges of its reasoning. Firstly, it has now decided several decisions in favour of 
the left-behind parents that therefore one should no longer fear that abducting parents are 
empowered by the Courts’ precedent. Secondly, the Court has repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of swift domestic procedures in line with the Abduction Convention and the 
Brussels IIa Regulation and has penalised the States that did not abide by this principle. So 
this is what remains: very high thresholds for the States. This is important; as the Court has to 
assure that the expectations for the States are high so that these cases can be resolved quickly. 
As was shown by Hoholm v. Slovakia, sometimes the proceedings are simply unacceptably 
protracted. However, in other cases, like M.A. v. Austria, the fault does not lie with the State, 
but with the parents themselves. One could ask if the Court was right to come to a violation. 
This balance between State responsibility and party responsibility is a difficult one to make. 
States have to be efficient and correct when performing an assessment of the entire situation, 
while ensuring there is no violation of the rights of the child, the abducting parent or the left-
behind parent – and the preference is to perform this assessment within six weeks’ time. 
Given that here will always be an aggrieved party due to the highly personal and controversial 
circumstances, one simply has to ask; is it even possible for States to overcome all these 
hurdles? 
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110
 The invoked rights only address the ones relevant for the topic of international parental child abduction and the ones actually investigated by the Court. In some cases more 
violations of other provisions of the Convention were alleged.  
111
 The applicant also invoked Article 6, but the Court, relying on the principle of jura novit curia, considered the complaint to fall under Article 8 ECHR. The applicant 
invoked Articles 14 and 17 too, but these were manifestly ill-founded: Ferrari v. Romania, paras 30-31 and 57-58. 
112
 The applicants also invoked Articles 6§1 and 13, but the Court did not consider if there was a violation since they relied on the same factual circumstances: Penchevi v. 
Bulgaria, para 78. 
113
 The applicant also invoked Articles 6§3 (a), (d) and (e), but these complaints were found to be manifestly ill-founded: Furman v. Slovenia and Austria, paras 141 and 142. 
114
 The applicant also invoked Article 8, but the Court considered that part of the complaint was already examined under Article 8 and the other part was rejected for non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies: Hoholm v. Slovakia, paras 65 and 66. 
 
Case 
Application 
number 
Date decided Applicant 
Invoked 
Convention 
rights
110
 
Violation? Final? 
Unanimous 
decision? 
1 Ferrari v. Romania 1714/10 28/04/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8
111
 Yes No Yes 
2 Adžić v. Croatia 22643/14 12/03/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Dissenting 
opinion judge 
Dedov 
3 Penchevi v. Bulgaria 77818/12 10/02/2015 Abducting 
parent and 
the child 
Art. 8 an art. 2 of 
Protocol No. 4 to 
the Convention
112
 
Yes, but only of 
art. 8 
Yes Yes 
4 Furman v. Slovenia and 
Austria 
16608/09 05/02/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8
113
 Yes, but only in 
respect of 
Slovenia 
Yes Yes 
5 M.A. v. Austria 4097/13 15/01/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Yes 
6 Hoholm v. Slovakia 35632/13 13/01/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 6§1 and art. 
13
114
 
Yes, both for the 
invoked rights 
alone as in 
conjunction with 
each other 
Yes Yes 
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115
 The applicants also invoked Article 13, but this issue overlapped with the merits of the main complaint under Article 8 and was not examined: Hromadka and Hromadkova 
v. Russia, paras 173 and 174. 
116
 The applicants also invoked Articles 6, but the Court only examined the complaint under Article 8 ECHR since it found the scope of the complaint to fall under Article 8 
ECHR. The applicant also invoked a violation of articles 1, 7, 11 and 12 of the Abduction Convention. The Court rejected these claims since they fall outside the scope of its 
jurisdiction ratione materiae: López Guió v. Slovakia, paras 77 and 114-115. 
7 Manic v. Lithuania 46600/11 13/01/2015 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Joint dissenting 
opinion judges 
Spano and 
Kjølbro 
8 Hromadka and Hromadkova v. 
Russia 
22909/10 11/12/2014 Left-behind 
parent and 
the child 
 
 
Art. 8
115
 Yes Yes Yes 
9 Cavani v. Hungary 5493/13 28/10/2014 Left-behind 
parent and 
the two 
children 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Yes 
10 V.P. v. Russia 61362/12 23/10/2014 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Yes 
11 
 
 
Blaga v. Romania 54443/10 01/07/2014 Left-behind 
parent 
Art. 8 Yes Yes Partly dissenting 
opinion judge 
López Guerra 
joined by judge 
Motoc over 
violation art. 6§1 
12 López Guió v. Slovakia 10280/12 03/06/2014 Left-behind 
parent 
Art.8
116
 Yes Yes Yes 
